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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal presents a legal question arising under the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines: What is the base offense 
level for conspiracy to commit sex trafficking by force, fraud, 
or coercion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c)? We hold that 
level 34 applies. 
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I 
Between 2011 and 2014, Appellant Jamiell Sims was a 
member of the “Black P-Stones,” an interstate gang that 
trafficked drugs and women. In his capacity as a “respect[ed]” 
member of the gang, Sims prostituted women online and 
provided them security while they worked. App. 73. He also 
collected money from the women and supplied them with 
drugs. Sims and his fellow gang members used force and 
coercion to trap women in a vicious cycle of drug addiction and 
prostitution. 
 Sims eventually pleaded guilty to, inter alia, one count 
of conspiracy to commit sex trafficking by force, fraud, or 
coercion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c). In its Presentence 
Investigation Report, the Probation Office assigned Sims a 
base offense level of 34 for the conspiracy offense. The 
Government agreed with that calculation, but Sims requested a 
base offense level of 14, which the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit had applied to the same crime in the case of 
United States v. Wei Lin, 841 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2016).  
The District Court agreed with the Government and the 
Probation Office, opining that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Wei Lin “defies the written words of the Guidelines. It defies 
logic.” App. 32. According to the District Court, when a 
conspiracy offense (like Sims’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1594(c)) is not covered by a specific section of the 
Sentencing Guidelines, then § 2X1.1 of the Guidelines applies. 
That section requires courts to apply the base offense level for 
the substantive offense underlying the conspiracy. U.S.S.G. 
§ 2X1.1(a). And because the substantive offenses underlying 
Sims’s conspiracy conviction were 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) and 
(b)(1), Guidelines § 2G1.1(a)(1) mandated a base offense level 
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of 34. When the District Court combined that base offense level 
(after some adjustments not at issue here) with Sims’s criminal 
history category of IV, his advisory Guidelines range was 151–
188 months’ imprisonment. The District Court imposed a 
sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range and Sims filed 
this timely appeal.1 
II 
A 
 The Sentencing Guidelines explicitly provide base 
offense levels for many federal crimes. But some crimes—
including the conspiracy at issue in this appeal—have not been 
directly assigned a base offense level. For conspiracy offenses 
not covered by a specific guideline, sentencing judges must use 
the following progression to calculate the base offense level.  
At first, the judge turns to Guidelines § 1B1.2, which 
explains: “[i]f the offense involved a conspiracy, attempt, or 
solicitation, refer to §2X1.1 (Attempt, Solicitation, or 
Conspiracy) as well as the guideline referenced in the Statutory 
Index for the substantive offense.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a) & cmt. 
n.1. Conspiracy under § 1594(c) is not covered by a specific 
guideline in the Statutory Index, so courts must follow § 2X1.1 
to determine the appropriate base offense level. See United 
States v. Boney, 769 F.3d 153, 162–63 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(a). We review the District Court’s interpretation 
of the Guidelines de novo. United States v. Aquino, 555 F.3d 
124, 127 (3d Cir. 2009).  
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Section 2X1.1(a), in turn, directs courts to apply “[t]he base 
offense level from the guideline for the substantive offense.” 
U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(a); United States v. Wright, 642 F.3d 148, 
151 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011). 
After determining the substantive offense underlying 
the conspiracy, the judge must apply the base offense level 
associated therewith. In this appeal, Sims pleaded guilty to 
violating § 1594(c) by conspiring to violate § 1591(a) and 
(b)(1). Guidelines § 2G1.1(a) applies to violations of those 
substantive offenses and provides for a base offense level of 34 
if the “offense of conviction” is § 1591(b)(1) or 14 
“otherwise.” U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1(a)(1)–(2). The base offense 
level of 34 for the substantive offense therefore applies to 
Sims’s conviction under § 1594(c). 
B 
Sims’s heavy reliance on Wei Lin does not alter our 
conclusion. There, the Ninth Circuit interpreted 
§ 2G1.1(a)(1)’s reference to a defendant’s “offense of 
conviction” to mean that a base offense level of 34 applies only 
to defendants “actually convicted of an offense subject to the 
punishment provided in 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1).” Wei Lin, 841 
F.3d at 826 (emphasis added). The court emphasized that Wei 
Lin’s plea agreement and judgment did not mention 
§ 1591(b)(1). Id. at 825. Instead, he pleaded guilty to violating 
§ 1594(c) with the underlying substantive offense being 
§ 1591(a). Id. But Sims pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate 
both § 1591(a) and (b)(1), so his reliance on that portion of Wei 
Lin is misplaced.  
 Moreover, following the Ninth Circuit’s Wei Lin opinion 
would lead to absurd results. Consider the following example. 
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A defendant convicted of a substantive sex trafficking offense 
involving force, fraud, or coercion in the Ninth Circuit will 
receive a base offense level of 34, while a defendant convicted 
of a substantive labor trafficking offense will receive a base 
offense level of 22. Compare U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1(a)(1), with 
U.S.S.G. § 2H4.1(a)(1). This is unsurprising because sex 
trafficking is an especially pernicious form of labor trafficking. 
Yet a defendant convicted of a sex trafficking conspiracy in the 
Ninth Circuit will receive a base offense level of just 14 while 
a defendant convicted of a labor trafficking conspiracy will still 
receive a base offense level of 22. Compare U.S.S.G. 
§ 2G1.1(a)(2), with U.S.S.G. § 2H4.1(a)(1). For defendants 
with a criminal history category of I, it would mean an advisory 
imprisonment range of only 15 to 21 months for a sex 
trafficking conspiracy but an advisory imprisonment range of 
41 to 51 months for a labor trafficking conspiracy. And for 
someone like Sims—whose criminal history was IV—it would 
mean an advisory imprisonment range of only 27 to 33 months 
instead of a range of 63 to 78 months.  
This incongruity is further revealed when one considers 
facts common to cases involving violations of § 1594(c). This 
case is a prime example. Sims contributed to the forced 
prostitution, abuse, and drug addiction of numerous young 
women. He was a “respect[ed]” member of a gang that “sexed” 
women into its employ by forcing them to have sex with a 
succession of gang members and accepts men into the gang 
only after they endure a twenty-one-second beating from five 
others. App. 69, 73. Given these facts, we are unpersuaded by 
Sims’s reliance on Wei Lin and think it inconceivable that the 
Sentencing Commission designed a system that would 
recommend punishing forced labor conspiracies more than 
twice as harshly as forced sex-labor conspiracies. 
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III 
Sims disagrees with the District Court’s finding that his 
base offense level was 34 by reverting to the fact that he was 
convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c). He argues that 
applying a base offense level of 34 is contrary to the plain 
language of § 2G1.1. This approach fails for several reasons. 
First, § 2G1.1 cannot be interpreted in isolation. When 
that section is considered in context, it’s clear that applying 
anything other than a base offense level of 34 would 
contravene the Guidelines progression as a whole. Sims was 
convicted of conspiring to commit the offenses in § 1591(a) 
and (b)(1). So the base offense level in Guidelines 
§ 2G1.1(a)(1) applies because that section specifically 
references convictions under § 1591(b)(1). See U.S.S.G. 
§ 2X1.1, cmt. n. 2 (“Under §2X1.1(a), the base offense level 
will be the same as that for the substantive offense.”). 
Section 2X1.1 does not—as Sims’s approach suggests—
instruct courts to apply the “Guidelines section” for the 
substantive offense. Instead, it requires courts to apply the 
“base offense level” for the substantive offense. U.S.S.G. 
§ 2X1.1(a). The “base offense level” applicable to the 
substantive offenses underlying Sims’s conviction is 34. 
U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1(a)(1). So the base offense level for Sims’s 
conspiracy conviction under § 1594(c) is likewise 34. 
 Second, Sims argues that § 2G1.1(a)(1) is not the proper 
Guidelines subsection because § 1591(b)(1) “was never 
specifically indicated as the object of the conspiracy.” Sims Br. 
10. The record states otherwise. Sims pleaded guilty to 
conspiring with others “knowing and in reckless disregard of 
the fact that force, threats of force, fraud, and coercion would 
be used to cause [several victims] to engage in a commercial 
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sex act, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1591(a) and (b)(1).” 
Supp. App. 10–11.  
Third, Sims’s approach fails to recognize that 
§ 1591(b)(1) is not a standalone offense; rather, it’s the 
punishment for violating § 1591(a) “if the offense was effected 
by means of force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion.” 18 
U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1). As one district court astutely noted, “[i]f 
the Court interpreted ‘offense of conviction’ [in Guidelines 
§ 2G1.1] literally, a base offense level of 34 would never be 
proper because the offense of conviction would always be 18 
U.S.C. § 1591(a), not (b)(1).” United States v. Yanchun Li, 
2013 WL 638601, at *2 (D. N. Mar. I. 2013) (citing United 
States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Section 
(b) . . . does not create a new crime. It specifies the penalties 
for each of the crimes set out in (a).”)).2  
Finally, the Guidelines definition also supports our 
conclusion. “Offense of conviction” is defined as “the offense 
conduct charged in the count of the indictment or information 
of which the defendant was convicted.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a). 
True, Wei Lin did not read § 1B1.2(a) as a “general 
definition.” 841 F.3d at 826. But we presume that the 
Sentencing Commission intended the phrase “offense of 
conviction” to mean the same thing throughout the Guidelines. 
See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2115 (2018); 
 
2 Even if Sims had pleaded guilty only to conspiring to 
violate § 1591(a), § 2G1.1(a)(1) still would apply. 
Subsections 1591(a) and (b)(1) are inextricably linked because 
(b)(1) is the punishment for violations of (a)(1). So convictions 
under § 1594(c) for conspiracy to violate § 1591(a) by means 
of force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion always subject a 
defendant to a base offense level of 34.  
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United States v. Gregory, 345 F.3d 225, 229 n.2 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(applying the presumption of consistent usage when 
interpreting the Sentencing Guidelines); see also United 
States v. Murillo, 933 F.2d 195, 199 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding 
that the phrases “the offense,” “offense of conviction,” and 
“instant offense” in the Sentencing Guidelines encompass “all 
conduct in furtherance of the offense of conviction”). 
The count of the Second Superseding Indictment to 
which Sims pleaded guilty charged him with conspiring with 
others to use “force, threats of force, fraud, and coercion” to 
cause numerous young women “to engage in a commercial sex 
act.” Supp. App. 10–11. And the relevant conduct in 
§ 1591(b)(1) is sex trafficking through “means of force, threats 
of force, fraud, or coercion[,] . . . or [] any combination of such 
means.” Sims’s offense conduct is identical to that proscribed 
conduct in § 1591(b)(1). So the appropriate base offense level 
for his conspiracy conviction is 34. 
* * * 
 We agree with the District Court’s Guidelines 
calculation. Conspiracy convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c) 
require the sentencing court to determine the base offense level 
for the substantive offense. Sims conspired to violate 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1591(a) and (b)(1), so his base offense level was 34 under the 
applicable Guideline (§ 2G1.1). We will affirm Sims’s 
judgment of sentence. 
